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COMMENTS
The Clean Air Act: Economic and Technological Feasibility
in Setting Standards Under Section 112
In January 1985, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) withdrew an amendment regulating national emission standards for the potent cancer-causing air pollutant vinyl chloride.' The Natural Resources
Defense Council (NRDC) challenged EPA's withdrawal in the United
States Court of Appeal for the District of Columbia.2 NRDC argued that
section 112 of the Clean Air Act,' under which EPA regulates hazardous
pollutants such as vinyl chloride, permits EPA to consider only health
factors in setting emission standards.' Because EPA relied on nonhealth
factors in withdrawing the proposed amendments, NRDC asked the court
to vacate EPA's action and remand the case for further proceedings.'
EPA, on the other hand, argued that it could consider technological
and economic feasibility in setting emission standards for hazardous air
pollutants under section 112. EPA claimed that section 112 vested it with
"considerable discretion" and that its choice to consider nonhealth factors in setting emission standards was entitled to great deference so long
as its choice to consider these factors was reasonable.'
The court agreed with EPA and found that the statute gave the agency discretion in setting standards.' The court also found that section 112
was ambiguous in specifying how EPA was to exercise that discretion.'
Citing Chevron US.A. v. NaturalResources Defense Council, Inc.' the

court affirmed EPA's action, finding the agency's decision to consider
economic and technological feasibility to be reasonable.' 0
By upholding EPA's decision to use economic and technological
feasibility considerations in setting emission standards under section 112
the court radically departed from settled judicial precedent interpreting
parallel provisions within the Clean Air Act."I The decision promotes lax
© Copyright 1987, University of Wyoming. See copyright notice at the beginning of
this issue.
1. 50 Fed. Reg. 1184 (1985). Studies showed that vinyl chloride cause angiosarcoma
of the liver, a rare form of liver cancer. See 40 id. 59,532 (1975).
2. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 804 F.2d 710 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
[hereinafter NRDC]. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (1982) permits any person to file a petition in the
D.C. Circuit for review of EPA action under § 5112 of the Clean Air Act.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1982).
4. NRDC, 804 F.2d at 711. In withdrawing the proposed regulatory amendments, the
EPA stated that certain aspects of the amendments imposed unreasonable costs and that
"no... control technology has been demonstrated to significantly and consistently reduce
emissions to a level below that required by the current standard." 50 Fed. Reg. 1182, 1184
(1985).
5. NRDC, 804 F.2d at 711.
6. Brief for Respondent at 12, NRDC (No. 85-1150).
7. NRDC, 804 F.2d at 727.
8. d2 at 711.
9. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
10. NRDC, 804 F.2d at 711.
11. Id at 731 (Wright, J., dissenting. As a general principle of administrative law an
agency may neither engage in cost-benefit analysis nor consider economic and technological
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emission standards and adversely affects public health in that it permits
more airborne carcinogens to enter the environment. Currently there are
four similar cases pending before the D.C. Circuit, each involving similar
challenges to EPA action concerning
benzene and radionuclides under sec2
tion 112 of the Clean Air Act.1
This comment examines the legislative history of section 112 and parallel provisions of the Clean Air Act to show that Congress never intended EPA to consider economic and technological feasibility in promulgating emission standards for hazardous air pollutants, except under the
limited circumstances spelled out in the statute. It will also examine the
relevant case law to show that both the D.C. Circuit as well as the Supreme
Court have interpreted the Clean Air Act as precluding EPA from considering such factors. The comment concludes that EPA's decision to consider feasibility in withdrawing the proposed regulations defeats the Clean
Air Act's purpose of forcing industries to develop pollution control technology.
BACKGROUND

Congress enacted the Clean Air Act 13 in 1970 to establish a joint state
and federal program to control and reduce air pollution. 4 Section 101(b)
of the Act'" provides that "[tihe purposes of this subchapter are . . . to
protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's Air resources so as to promote the public health and welfare ...of its population." Protection of
public health is absolute under the Act even though there are no emission levels below which pollution does no harm. 6 Section 112 precludes
trade-offs between health and other concerns such as economic and technological feasibility."
The Clean Air Act attempts to achieve the goal of clean air primarily
by setting standards for ambient air. 8 Sections 10819 and 10920 give EPA
authority to promulgate primary and secondary national ambient air qualfeasibility in setting health standards unless it has explicit statutory authority to do so.
See, e.g., American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 510 (1981); Union Electric
Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 257 n.5 (1975).
12. The benzene cases are NRDC v. Thomas, No. 84-1387 (D.C. Cir. filed 1984) and EDF
v. Thomas, No. 84-1524 (D.C. Cir. filed 1984). The radionuclides cases are NRDC v. Thomas,
No. 84-1123 (D.C. Cir. filed 1984) and American Motors Corp. v. EPA, No. 85-1285 (D.C.
Cir. filed 1984).
13. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970)
[hereinafter the Act]. Congress amended the Act in 1977, Clean Air Act Amendments of
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977), and in 1981, Steel Industry Compliance Extension Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-73, 95 Stat. 139 (1981) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7401-7626 (1982) & Supp. III 1985)).
14. See Schoenbrod, Goals Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case of the Clean Air Act,
30 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 740, 745 (1983).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b) (1982).
16. Schoenbrod, supra note 14, at 743.
17. Id; see also NRDC, 804 F.2d at 731 (Wright, J., dissenting).
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408-7410 (1982).
19. Id § 7408.
20. Id § 7409.
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ity standards (NAAQS). Section 110 of the Act" requires that each state
develop a state implementation plan (SIP) which ensures that the nation
will meet and maintain the Act's ambient air standards. Within nine
months after the EPA promulgates or revises a standard, each state must
formulate plans to achieve a standard in accordance with eleven criteria
outlined in section 110(a)(2).22 The states then submit their plans to the
EPA for its approval.
Section 112 of the Clean Air Act 23 complements the ambient air quality
program by establishing highly protective federal standards for the most
24
toxic air pollutants which are not covered by the NAAQS. Under sec25
Within
air
pollutants.
hazardous
of
a
list
publish
must
EPA
tion 112(b)
180 days of listing such pollutants, EPA must propose an emission standard for each pollutant. 26 The standard takes effect immediately for new
plants and ninety days later for existing plants. 2 To date EPA has listed
only seven hazardous air pollutants, which include asbestos, beryllium,
2
mercury, 28 benzene, z9 radionuclides 0 and vinyl chloride. '
A strict interpretation of section 112 requires EPA to promulgate a
standard that totally eliminates emissions of airborne carcinogens. A zeroemissions standard comports with the Clean Air Act's policy of forcing
2
industry to develop pollution control technology. Because the vinyl
EPA's promulgatechnology,
this
developed
not
has
chloride industry
tion of a zero-emissions standard would shut down the industry. The
legislative history of the Clean Air Act indicates that Congress intended
21. 1& § 7410.
22. 1& § 7410(a)(2).
23. Id.§ 7412.
24. Id § 7412(b)(1)(A). Section 7412(a)(1) defines hazardous air pollutant as "an air pollutant to which no ambient air quality standard is applicable and which in the judgment of
the Administrator causes, or contributes to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated
to result in an increase in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating
reversible illness."
25. Id § 7412(b)(1)(A).
26. I.§ 7412(b)(1)(B). An emission standard is defined in § 302(k) of the Act as a "requirement established by ...the Administrator which limits the quantity, rate, or concentration of emissions of air pollutants on a continuous basis..."Id § 7602(k). Section 112(e)(1)
permits EPA to set a "design, equipment, work practice, or operational standard" if it is
not feasible to prescribe or enforce an emission standard." Id § 7412(e)(1). Infeasibility is
restricted by § 112(e)(2) to three circumstances: (1)where the pollutant cannot be ducted
through a centralized smokestack, control device, or other conveyance, (2)where use of such
a conveyance "would be inconsistent with any Federal, State, or local law," or (3) where it
is economically or technologically impracticable to measure emission rates, quantities, or
concentrations. Id §§ 7412(e)(1) to -(3).
27. Id § 7412(c)(1)(B)(i).
28. Asbestos, beryllium and mercury were listed as hazardous air pollutants on March
29, 1971. 36 Fed. Reg. 5931 (1971). EPA set final emission standards in these pollutants
on April 6, 1973. 38 id at 8820 (1973) (codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 61.32, .52, .147 (1986)).
29. 42 Fed. Reg. 29,332 (1977). EPA promulgated final emission standards on June
6, 1984. 49 id. at 23,498 (1984) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 61.110 (1986)).
30. 44 id. at 76,738 (1979).
31. 40 id. at 59,532 (1975). EPA listed vinyl chloride as a hazardous air pollutant on
December 24, 1975. Id at 59,477 (1975).
32. See Note, Forcing Technology: The Clean Air Act Experience, 88 YALE L.J. 1713

(1979).
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such a result) 3 EPA, however, has never interpreted section 112 in this
manner.3 4 Rather, the agency reads the statute as allowing for consideration of economic and technological feasibility in setting hazardous pollutant emission limits.3 5
In 1975, EPA designated vinyl chloride as a hazardous air pollutant
to which no known level of human exposure was safe.3 6 The agency finally promulgated vinyl chloride standard in 1976.1 Because exposure to
vinyl chloride is unsafe at any level, EPA could have set a standard which
allowed for "no measurable emissions."35 The agency declined to promulgate a zero-emissions standard because it found that such a standard
would economically disrupt the industry. 9 Instead, EPA designed its 1976
standard to reduce emissions to a level achievable by the use of best
available control technology. 4' The agency determined that this standard
would reduce emissions by ninety-five percent and increase the cost of
vinyl chloride resin by 7.3 percent.4' EPA found that a standard which
reduced emissions by ninety-five percent assured that the cost of achieving the standard was "not grossly disproportionate to the amount of emission reduction achieved."' Though control technology existed which could
have reduced emissions even more, EPA refused to require the industry
to implement it because the agency believed that the technology's cost
would be grossly disproportionate to its benefits.'"
When EPA promulgated this standard, it determined that 4.6 million
people lived within a five-mile radius of vinyl chloride factories.4 The agency estimated that the people living in this radius were exposed to vinyl
chloride in concentrations that ranged from one part-per-million (ppm) to
thirty-three ppm.4 5 The lowest level of vinyl chloride exposure at which
the agency conducted tests was 50 ppm.4' This low level of exposure was
sufficient to cause liver cancer in rats and mice. 47 Upon promulgating the
1976 vinyl chloride standard, the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) sued
EPA to force a stricter emission standard." EDF argued that section 112
required a stricter standard because EPA ignored experiments which in33. See infra text accompanying note 72.
34. Doniger, FederalRegulation of Vinyl Chloride:A Short Course in the Law andPolicy
of Toxic Substances Contro4 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 497, 571 (1978).
35. Telephone interview with Earl Salo, Attorney for EPA (Jan. 9, 1987).
36. 40 Fed. Reg. 59,477 (1975).
37. 41 id. at 46,560 (1976).
38. See infra text accompanying note 77.
39. 44 Fed. Reg. 58,660 (1979).
40. 40 id at 59,535 (1975). The agency rejected approaches that called for either zeroemissions standards or a standard based on cost-benefit analysis. 41 id, 46,561-62 (1976).
41. 40 id. at 59,543-44 (1975).
42. 41 id at 46,562 (1976). EPA stated that it could consider costs to a limited extent. Id
43. 40 id. at 59,536 (1975).
44. 40 id. at 59,533.

45. Id
46. Id at 59,532.
47. Id
48. Doniger, supra note 34, at 581 & n.438 (citing Environmental Defense Fund v. Train,
No. 76-2045 (D.C. Cir. filed Nov. 19, 1976; settled & dismissed June 24, 1977)).
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9
dicated that vinyl chloride was far more lethal than the agency believed.'
EDF cited experiments which showed that rats developed cancer after
0
being exposed to as little as one ppm. The case was never litigated,
however, because EDF and EPA reached a settlement agreement in 1977."'
EPA agreed to propose an amended standard designed to force the vinyl
52
chloride industry to achieve a zero-emissions standard. The amendment,
which EPA proposed in 1977, would have reduced emissions to five ppm
at existing plants within three years. 3

Unfortunately, EPA never adopted the 1977 amendment proposed
under the settlement agreement with EDF. The agency decided to withdraw the proposed amendment 4 because it was technologically and economically unjustified."5 In its notice of withdrawal, EPA stated that its
new standard would be based on levels already achieved by the vinyl
chloride industry. 6 Thus, EPA plans to use feasibility in determining
the standard to set under section 112's "ample margin of safety" provision.
The last sentence of section 112(b)(1)(B) was the focus of dispute in
NRDC v. EPA." That subsection provides that "[tihe Administrator shall
establish any such standard at the level which in his judgment provides
an ample margin of safety to protect the public health from such hazardous air pollutants." 8 The NRDC argued that the legislative history of
section 112 clearly demonstrated that under this section EPA could consider only protection of public health in setting emission standards for
hazardous air pollutants.5" The court, however, examined the legislative
history and found that "Congress did not preclude consideration of
economic and technological considerations ....-60
49. Id
50. Id.
51. Id at 582.
52. 42 Fed. Reg. 28,156 (1977).
53. Id
54. 50 id 1182 (1985).
55. Id. at 1183. The agency stated that the "current VC standard was based on
judgments concerning the costs and benefits of the standard to society. The standard is not
designed to eliminate VC exposure risk entirely. Rather, it strikes a balance between public
health protection and the cost of that protection." Ild.
56. Id at 1184. The agency stated:
Because the proposed 5 ppmv emission limit was not based on data from a
control technology different from that analyzed for the current standard and
because 10 ppmv represents the lowest level of control which has been consistently achieved, the EPA withdraws the proposed 5 ppmv limit and affirms
the original 10 ppmv limit. If such a technology had been identified, it could
have been the basis of a revised standard. However, during the review study
no more advanced technology was identified, even though additional data on
incinerators... were obtained. Although these data indicate that incinerators
are capable of reducing emissions below 10 ppmv, 10 ppmv represents the lowest
level of control which has been consistently achieved.

Id
57.
58.
59.
60.

804 F.2d 710 (D.C. Cir. 19861.
42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(B) (1982).
NRDC, 804 F.2d at 716.
Id at 723.
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Legislative History of Section 112
Section 112 began as section 115 of Senate Bill 4358 and section 112
of House Resolution 17255.61 The Senate bill's strict provisions prohibited
emissions of hazardous pollutants for all sources for which no safe level
of exposure existed and permitted consideration only of health factors.62
The Senate bill defined a hazardous air pollutant in almost identical terms
as the final law. 6 The bill required the Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare"6 to set emissions standards necessary to protect public
health. The Senate Report stated that the Administrator "would be required to publish a proposed prohibition of emissions of such agents or
combinations of such agents from any stationary source." 65 Senator
Muskie, the principal proponent of the Act, told the Senate that "[tihe
committee was presented with strong evidence that any level of emissions
of certain pollutants may produce adverse effects that cannot be tolerated. " A summary of the provisions of the conference agreement presented
by Senator Muskie clearly showed that the requirement to protect public
health with an ample margin of safety "could mean, effectively, that a
plant would be required to close because of the absence of control techniques. It could include emission standards which allowed no measurable
emission." 67
Section 112 of the House Resolution on the other hand, prohibited
emissions of extremely hazardous air pollutants from only new sources.
The bill required the Administrator to set standards for new sources of
pollutants which substantially endangered public health. For these
pollutants, the Administrator could consider economic and technological
factors. Section 112(b)(1) of the House bill provided that "[i]f emissions
are extremely hazardous to health, no new source of such emissions shall
be constructed or operated, except where (and subject to such conditions
as he deems necessary and appropriate) the [Administrator] makes a
specific exemption with respect to such construction.' '66 Had Congress
enacted this version, it would have limited regulation of hazardous
pollutants to new sources and would have permitted EPA to make specific
exemptions from prohibitions on the basis of nonhealth considerations.
Congress, however, did not enact this language. Instead, the final
legislation followed the Senate Bill, rejecting the provision contained in
the House bill. Unlike the House version, the final legislation also applied
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

See S. 4358, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 6(b), 116 CONG. REc. 32,375 (1970).
See id.; H.R. 17255, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 5(a), 116 CONG. REC. 19226 (1970).
S. 4358, supra note 61, § 6(b), at 32,375.
The EPA had not yet been created.
S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1970), reprintedin ENVT'L POL'Y Div.,

CONG. RES. SERV., L13R. OF CONG., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMEND-

MENTS OF 1970, SER. No. 93-18, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 420 (prepared for Senate Comm. on Pub.
Works)

[hereinafter

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]

66. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 65, at 227.
67. 116 CONG. REC. 42,385 (1970).
68. H.R. 17255, § 5, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) (as reported by the House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce), reprintedin LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 65, at
921 (proposing new § 112(b)(1)).
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these health requirements to existing, as well as new, sources. The final
Act did, however, contain three limited exceptions: (1) a ninety-day delay
in applying the new standard to existing sources; (2) grant of a two-year
waiver for existing sources; and (3) a two-year Presidential waiver upon
a Presidential finding that the technology to implement the new standard
is unavailable and the operation of the source is necessary for national
security. 9
Thus, the final version of section 112 was clearly based on the Senate
bill. Section 112 regulates all emissions, as did the Senate bill, while the
House bill would have regulated only new sources. The final version, like
the Senate bill, contains no provision giving EPA broad discretion to grant
exceptions from emission standards.
Because the final version closely resembles the Senate bill insofar as
it prohibited economic and technological feasibility considerations, one
can infer that the Act does not allow consideration of these factors in setting standards under Section 112. As the dissenting opinion pointed out
in NRDC v. EPA,7" "[iut
would be odd to discover a 'rule' of statutory construction that indicated that final bills resembling the version of one house
are to be evaluated according to the legislative history of the other house's

version.

71

ANALYSIS

Congressional prohibition of economic and technological feasibility
reflects the "technology-forcing" policy of the Clean Air Act. In passing
the Act, Congress set seemingly unattainable goal to force industry to
develop and implement pollution control technology. 2 This policy may
require EPA to set zero emission standard for all nonthreshold pollutants, 3 despite unavailability of technology and or the cost of compliance.
In Union Electric Co. v. EPA,7 4 the Supreme Court held that under the
Clean Air Act, a coal-fired power plant either had to comply with EPA
approved emission standards or shut down." 5 The Court stated:
[TJhe 1970 Amendments to the Clean Air Act were a drastic remedy to what was perceived as a serious and otherwise uncheckable
problem of air pollution ....These requirements are of a "technology-forcing character" ... and are expressly designed to force
regulated sources to develop pollution control devices that might
at the time appear to be economically or technologically infeas7
ible. 6
69. H.R. REP. No. 1783, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 112, at 46-47 (1970), reprinted in
supra note 65, at 196-97 (report of conference committee).
70. 804 F.2d 710, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
71. Id at 733-34 (Wright, J., dissenting).
72. See generally Note, supra note 32.
73. A nonthreshold pollutant has no safe human exposure level. See Graham, The Failure
of Agency-Forcing: The Regulation of Airborne CarcinogensUnder Section 112 of the Clean
Air Act, 1985 DUKE L.J. 100, 117 n.111.
74. 427 U.S. 246 (1976).
75. See infra text accompanying note 113.
76. Union Electric, 427 U.S. at 256-57.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
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The Court thus found that Congress intended to promote rapid innovations in pollution control technology.1 In withdrawing the proposed
amendments to its vinyl chloride standard, EPA undercut this policy and
decided the industry could never achieve a zero emissions standard.
The agency's decision is speculative because it has never set a standard which would have forced the industry to try to eliminate vinyl
chloride emissions. Its withdrawal of the 1976 amendment reflects more
than a refusal to force technology. In scrapping the amendments, the agency stated that it would not even require the industry to use presently
78
available pollution control technology. EPA took this position even
though its own studies demonstrated that current technology could substantially reduce vinyl chloride emissions during certain phases of the
manufacturing process. 79 In some instances, even the vinyl chloride industry has been more optimistic than EPA about its ability to reduce emissions." EPA's decision to relax its vinyl chloride standard could destroy
the industry's incentive to improve control technology. By allowing
feasibility and cost-benefit analyses to enter its calculations, EPA undermines the technology-forcing policy underlying the Clean Air Act and frustrates congressional intent.81
Despite EPA's reluctance to regulate hazardous air pollutants in accordance with the strict mandate of section 112, the agency cannot interpret the statute in a way that simply reflects its views of what constitutes
good social policy. EPA expressed the view that zero-emission standards
82
for vinyl chloride "would produce massive social dislocations" because
concern
agency's
The
few industries could comply with such standards.
however is speculative since it has never set a zero-emission standard.
Further, Congress contemplated some closure of industries unable to comply with regulations promulgated under section 112.11 In Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Hill,84 the Supreme Court stated that "the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular course consciously selected by Congress is to be
85
put aside in the process of interpreting a statute." At issue in Hill was
the operation of
prevented
19738
of
Act
Species
whether the Endangered
a federal dam, constructed by the TVA. Operation of the dam would have
7
destroyed a critical habitat of the snail darter, which the Secretary of
77. See, e.g., Note, supra note 32, at 1713. EPA accepted technology-forcing in the electric
utilities and copper smelting industries. In both cases, these industries developed technology
to achieve emission standards promulgated under the Clean Air Act. Id at 1714.
78. 50 Fed. Reg. 1184 (1985).
79. For example, one vinyl chloride plant used an incineration method to reduce emissions to 0.26 ppm. Another plant used a control system that recovered 99.99 percent of vinyl
chloride from exhaust vents. Still another plant developed a system which reduces vinyl
chloride to less than 1 ppm from VC concentrations containing between 10 and 10,000 ppm.
See Brief for Petitioner at 32 n.51, NRDC (No. 85-1150).
80. Id. at 33 n.53.
81. See, e.g., Union Electric, 427 U.S. at 268.
82. 44 Fed. Reg. 58,660 (1979).
83. See supra text accompanying note 76.
84. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
85. Id. at 194.
86. Id at 156.
87. Id at 165.
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the Interior had listed as an endangered species. 8 The TVA argued that
the Endangered Species Act could not be interpreted to prevent operation of a dam in which Congress had spent $100 million. The Court disagreed and concluded that the Act "requireld] precisely that result."8 9
The Court's holding expressed the proposition that Congress, not an
administrative agency, is responsible for deciding what objectives constitute good social policy. This proposition makes sense since Congress,
unlike an administrative agency, is directly accountable to its constituency
and is able to amend a law if it determines that the law promotes
undesirable social consequences. Because EPA has never required the
vinyl chloride industry to implement zero-emission standards, Congress
cannot know whether section 112's mandate realistically solves hazardous
air pollution. If regulations based on a strict interpretation of the statute
were to promote the "social dislocation" envisioned by EPA, Congress
could amend section 112 to allow EPA to consider economic and technological feasibility if technology-forcing proved unworkable. Until Congress
makes that choice, however, EPA is statutorily obligated to set emissions
standards without consideration of feasibility. EPA's consistent refusal
to do so means the agency is acting beyond its statutory authority and
thus amounts to government by an administrative agency.
In Chevron, U.S.A. v. NaturalResources Defense Council, Inc. the
Supreme Court held that when the intent of Congress is unclear on a particular issue, the courts may reverse an agency's interpretation of a
statutory provision only if it is "impermissible" or "unreasonable." ' 0 If
"the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court,
as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress.' ' 9 In NRDC v. EPA9 1 the D.C. Circuit purported to
follow Chevron. The Court found that the language of section 112 was
not so unambiguous that it revealed a clear congressional intent to make
it a "health," rather than a "technology-based," provision.
The court flatly rejected NRDC's position that EPA could consider
only health factors under section 112(b)(1)(B) because the statute gave
93
EPA discretion in the area of scientific uncertainty.
To have accepted
NRDC's position would have meant that "no such discretion would be
necessary, [because] deciding how much uncertainty to allow from a strictly health-based perspective would always lead to the same answernone." 94 Even when EPA was uncertain about the health effects of a hazardous air pollutant, it would still be required to prohibit any emission
because the statute's focus on health would preclude discretion to consider factors other than health." The court therefore held that when there
88. Id. at 161.
89. Id. at 172-73.

90. 467 U.S. 837, 839-40 (1984).
91. Id. at 482-83.
92. 804 F.2d 710 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
93. Id at 716.

94. Id.
95. Id.
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is scientific uncertainty regarding the "ample margin of safety" provision, the EPA may consider economic and technological feasibility in setting emission standards for hazardous air pollutants. In other words, Congress did not preclude consideration of nonhealth factors "in the range
of emissions where health effects are uncertain.'""
The court reasoned that Congress must have intended this result
because, as "the Administrator has no way of knowing health effects in
the range of uncertainty, such considerations... seem natural.., choices
amply provided
to inform the Administrator's decision whether he has
97
for a reasonable degree of safety from the unknown." Thus, only when
EPA has absolute scientific knowledge that a substance endangers the
public in trace amounts may the agency ignore economic and technological
feasibility and prohibit emissions of that pollutant."
The court also found NRDC's reading of section 112's legislative
history to be "strained." 99 NRDC argued that because the final version
of section 112 resembled the Senate bill, Congress must have0 deliberately eliminated the feasibility considerations in the House bill.' The court,
however, found the legislative history ambiguous with respect to what
EPA could consider in setting hazardous air pollutant standards. The
court read the legislative history as supporting an inference 0that EPA
could consider nonhealth factors in setting these standards.' '
Because section 112 did not restrict EPA to health factors and was
"ambiguous" concerning other factors which EPA could consider in "providing for an ample margins of safety to protect the public health,"102 the
court refrained from imposing its own construction on the statute. Instead, the court merely bowed to the Supreme Court's mandate in
Chevron' 3 and upheld the agency's construction of section 112 because
that construction was a "reasonable one.''10
Prior to NRDC v. EPA, EPA acknowledged that a literal reading of
section 112 might require zero-emission standards for nonthreshold pollutants.' EPA, however, has never issued zero-emission standards. In
the two cases where it has regulated nonthreshold pollutants--asbestos
standards in favor
and vinyl chloride-the agency rejected zero-emission
10 6
of standards based on available technology. Prior to NRDC v. EPA,
96. Id. at 723.
97. Id. at 722.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 717.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 719.
102. Id. at 722 (quoting Chevron U.S.A. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)).
103. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
104. NRDC, 804 F.2d at 722.
105. Graham, supra note 73, at 123.
106. Id. (citing Final Vinyl Chloride Emission Standards, 41 Fed. Reg. 46,560-62 (1976)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 61.60 to .71 (1981) (proposed Oct. 21, 1976); Final Emission Standards in Asbestos, Beryllium, and Mercury, 38 Fed. Reg. 8820, 8820-22 (codified at 40 C.F.R.
§§ 61.01 to .53 (1986) (proposed Apr. 6, 1973)).
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the agency's legal position in promulgating these standards had never
been judicially tested." 7 Thus, NRDC posed a question of first impression. As the following analysis will show, however, there is no support
for the majority's conclusion that EPA could consider nonhealth factors
in setting emission standards under section 112.
SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT

In Union Electric Co. v. EPA, the Supreme Court considered whether
the EPA had authority under section 110(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act'0 8 to
reject an SIP because it was economically or technologically infeasible.
In that case, Union Electric, a coal-fired utility company, could not meet
new sulfur dioxide emission standards which the state of Missouri had
promulgated pursuant to section 110(a)(1). After EPA notified the company that its sulfur dioxide emissions were violating Missouri's emission
standards, Union Electric sued to overturn EPA's approval of these standards, arguing that the standards were economically and technologically
infeasible. The Supreme Court rejected Union Electric's argument and
held that EPA could never consider economic and technological infeasibility in evaluating state emission standards because section 110 contained
no provisions allowing for such consideration. 09 The Court noted that,
"[w]here Congress intended the Administrator to be concerned about
economic and technological infeasibility, it expressly so provided."'' 0
The majority in NRDC v. EPA, found the Supreme Court's rule in
Union Electric inapplicable to section 112 because that case decided only
that EPA was not required to consider economic and technological feasibility. The majority inferred that EPA might retain discretion to consider
such factors if it so chose."' The majority's reasoning was specious because the Supreme Court held in Union Electric that "[tlhe mandatory
'shall' makes it quite clear that the Administrator is not to be concerned
with factors other than those specified.""' The Court held that under section 110, "economic or technological infeasibility may not be considered .. ."" Because section 112(b)(i)(B) contains no provision allowing
EPA to apply economic and technological feasibility, the majority's attempt in NRDC to distinguish Union Electric is a distinction without a
difference.
107. Id. at 131.

108. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) 11982). Section 110(a)(1) requires each state to devise, subject to EPA approval, an implementation plan providing for attainment of NAAQS, both
primary standards (those necessary to protect the public health) and secondary standards
(those necessary to protect the public welfare).
109. Union Electric,427 U.S. at 265. The Court reiterated this rule in American Textile
Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981). In Donovan, the Court held that, "[wihen Congress has intended that an agency engage in cost-benefit analysis, it has clearly indicated
such intent on the face of the statute." 452 U.S. at 510.
110. Union Electric,427 U.S. at 257 n.5. Section 110(a)(2) lists eights criteria which EPA
must consider in approving a state implementation plan. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) (1982). Because
economic and technological feasibility was not listed as a criterion, the Court concluded EPA
could not consider this factor in evaluating a SIP.
111. NRDC v. EPA, 804 F.2d 710, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
112. Union Electric, 427 U.S. at 257.
113. Id. at 265 (emphasis added).
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CIRCUIT PRECEDENT

The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has twice before interpreted the
Clean Air Act's margin of safety requirement.1 1 4 In both cases the court
found that this requirement unambiguously precluded EPA from considering economic and technological feasibility in setting emission standards.
In NRDC v. EPA, however, the D.C. Circuit considered the same requirement but reached the opposite conclusion.
In Hercules, Inc. v. EPA a pesticide manufacturer challenged EPA
regulations restricting discharges into the nation's watercourses of two
toxic substances." 5 These regulations required the manufacturer to reduce
its discharge of endrin to 0.005 pounds per day."' Velsico 11 7 sued to invalidate EPA's endrin regulations on the ground that EPA abused its
discretion when it failed to consider economic and technological feasibility in promulgating those regulations.' 8The D.C. Circuit upheld the regulations because section 307(a) of the Clean Water Act," 9 under which the
EPA promulgated the regulations, did not require EPA to consider those
factors.'
Although this case involved a challenged under the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act,"' the court's decision was influenced by similarities
between the regulatory schemes of that Act and the Clean Air Act.122 More
importantly, the court found that the Clean Air Act "distinguished between pollutants subject to technology-based regulations under section
111 and hazardous substances, subject to health-based regulations under
section 112. Recognizing that 'certain pollutants' required special treatment because of risk to health, Congress enacted section 112, dealing with
hazardous pollutants, without provision for considerations of feasibility."13
The majority in NRDC v. EPA failed to see how its prior observation
in Hercules strengthened NRDC's claim that the "ample margin of safety" provision of section 112 prohibited consideration of economic and tech114. See Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1042 (1980); Hercules, Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
115. Hercules, 598 F.2d at 97. The substances were toxaphene and endrin. The EPA
regulated discharges of these toxins pursuant to § 307(a) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments of 1972. 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a) (1982).
116. Hercules, 598 F.2d at 98.
117. The court considered two challenges brought by pesticide manufacturers-Hercules,
Inc. and Velsicol. The court consolidated the two cases. Id at 97.
118. Id. at 110.
119. 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a) (1982).
120. Hercules, 598 F.2d at 111. Section 307(a) enumerated six criteria which EPA could
consider in setting discharge standards for toxic water pollutants. Because none involved
economic and technological criteria, the court agreed with EPA and rejected the manufacturer's argument. The court's interpretation was reinforced by § 307(a)(4) which required
"EPA to set standards providing 'an ample margin of safety' without any mention of feasibility criteria." 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a) (1982).
121. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982).
122. Supra note 11.

123. Hercules, 598 F.2d at 112 (emphasis added).
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nological feasibility.'1 4 The court instead found that Hercules merely stood
for the proposition that the ample margin of safety language did not require economic and technological considerations.'25 This interpretation is
incorrect given the D.C. Circuit's conclusion in Hercules that "Congress
deliberately selected only health and environmental factors for EPA considerations.' 6 The majority's effort to read the rule in Hercules as permitting EPA to consider nonhealth factors under the "ample margin of
safety" provision is thoroughly unconvincing. '
As in Hercules, the D.C. Circuit reached the same result in Lead Industries Association v. EPA.' 2 There, the Lead Industry Association
challenged EPA's promulgation of primary air quality standards for lead
under section 109 of the Clean Air Act. Section 109(b)(1) requires EPA
to set primary air quality standards that "allow an adequate margin of
safety ... to protect the public health."' 2 9 The association argued that
section 109 required EPA to consider economic and technological feasibility in determining the appropriate margin of safety to set under section
109(b)(1). 3" The D.C. Circuit rejected this argument and held that section
109(b)(1)'s "adequate margin of safety" requirement prohibited EPA from
considering these factors in setting primary ambient air quality standards."' The court stated that "[w]here Congress intended the Administrator to be concerned about economic and technological feasibility, it expressly so provided."12 Following the Union Electric rule the court
concluded that nothing in section 109(b)'s "language suggested that the
Administrator is to consider economic and technological feasibility in setting ambient air quality standards."' 33
Though the court's holding in Lead Industriesappears to compel the
conclusion that section 112 precludes similar considerations, the majority in NRDC v. EPA thought otherwise. The majority found this rule inapplicable because "the court in Lead Industriesbased its holding on strucNRDC v. EPA, 804 F.2d 710, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
Id
Petition for Rehearing at 5, NRDC (No. 85-1150).
The court in Hercules stated:
[T]he congressional selection of factors is a legislative determination that the
need of the public and the environment for protection from toxic chemicals
is more important than the problems of stringent regulation. This congressional
determination is a rational response to the dangers presented by toxic
substances. The meaning of the statute being clear, it is not this court's
prerogative to impose considerations of feasibility.
598 F.2d at 112.
128. 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied 449 U.S. 1042 (1986).
129. 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1982). At issue in Lead Industries was a statutory scheme requiring EPA to regulate air pollutants whose emission "cause or contribute to air pollution
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare." Id § 7408(a)(1)(A);
see also Lead Industries,647 F.2d at 1136. Under 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(2) EPA must publish
"air quality criteria for the pollutants listed. The EPA then prescribes primary and secondary ambient air standards based on these criteria." Id. § 7409.
130. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (1982).
131. Lead Industries,647 F.2d at 1148.
132. Id
133. Id at 1148-49.
124.
125.
126.
127.
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tural aspects of the ambient air pollution provisions not germane here."' 34
Unlike section 112,'11 section 109(b)'s ambient air standards 136 must be
based on so-called 'air quality criteria, which section 108137 defines as comprising several elements, all related to health. "118 The majority stated that
these "air quality criteria" under section 108 excluded economic and
technological considerations. Thus, the court in Lead Industriesmust have
reasoned that such criteria also "foreclosed reliance on such factors in setting ambient air quality standards .
3.."119
Because sections 112, by contrast, is not based on specific, enumerated, health criteria, the statute's
mandate "to provide an ample margin of safety to protect the public
health," may well demonstrate a congressional intent for the EPA to consider nonhealth criteria in providing for this ample margin of safety.
The majority's tortured distinction in Lead Industries, makes the adequate margin of safety provision under section 109 more protective of
health than section 112's ample margin of safety. Unlike the pollutants
regulated under section 109, the pollutants regulated under section 112
are carcinogenic.' 40 The decision in NRDC v. EPA, means that the agency now has more discretion to regulate highly toxic air pollutants than
it has in regulating less toxic air pollutants. "'
DISCRETION AND EXCEPTIONS UNDER SECTION

112

Section 112(b)(1)(B) provides that "[tihe Administrator shall establish
any such standard at the level which in his judgment provides an ample
margin of safety to protect the public health .... 142 The majority found
that the Administrator's judgment under section 112(b)(1) necessarily includes discretion to consider economic and technological feasibility."" It
stated that if health were the only factor EPA could consider in establishing standards, the Administrator's discretion under section 112(b)(1)(B)
would disappear because "any decision informed solely by health... would
require a prohibition of any emissions.''14 Thus to give the word judgment meaning, Congress must have intended EPA to consider nonhealth
factors in establishing standards.
The dissenting opinion in NRDC v. EPA showed that not only does
EPA have discretion under section 112, but also that the majority's interpretation reads two subsections out of the statute. For example, section 112 gives EPA discretion to determine whether a hazardous pollu134. Id. at 724.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1982).
Id. § 7409(b).
Id § 7408.
NRDC, 804 F.2d at 724.
Id
Id at 737 (Wright, J., dissenting) (citing U.S. COMPTROLLER GEN., DELAYS IN EPA's
REGULATIONS OF HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS 8-11 (1983)).
141. Id at 731.
142. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(B) (1982) (emphasis added).
143. NRDC, 804 F.2d at 716.
144. Id.
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tant has a safe level of exposure. If the agency decided that such a pollutant had
a safe level of exposure, EPA could permit emissions to that ex4
tent. 1
The absence of feasibility language in section 112(b)(1)(B)' 46 is important when compared to other provisions in section 112 which allow for
economic and technological feasibility. Section 112(e)(2) restrictively
defines "not feasible" as including situations where control techniques
is impracticable "due to
are unavoidable or measurement methodology
' 7
technological or economic limitations.' 1
Section 112 has two subsections which permit feasibility considerations under special circumstances. Section 112(b) allows EPA to devise
an operational standard whenever it is infeasible to impose an emission
standard.148 Section 112 also is an exception in that section 112(c)(2) allows
for a Presidential waiver from enforcement of an emission standard if the
President determines that the regulation is technologically impossible to
achieve and that the industry subject to the regulation is necessary to
national security.' These two subsections would be meaningless unless
Congress intended to preclude EPA from considering feasibility under section 112. In other words, if EPA could always consider feasibility under
section 112, Congress would have had no reason to allow for certain limited
economic and technological feasibility exemptions. EPA, however, withdrew its 1977 proposed regulations of vinyl chloride, not because it found
that it was impossible to prescribe an emission standard, but because it
decided that best available technology was insufficient to achieve the proposed standard.1 50
CONCLUSION

The majority in NRDC v. EPA laboriously searched to detect an ambiguity in section 112. Upon finding an ambiguity where none previously
existed, the majority improperly used the Supreme Court's holding in
Chevron to permit EPA to use economic and technology feasibility in
deciding to withdraw proposed regulations of a deadly carcinogen. The
Supreme Court's holding in Chevron requires lower federal courts to defer
to an agency's interpretation of a statute only when that statute is ambiguous and the agency's statutory interpretation is reasonable. Even
though section 112 unambiguously prohibits consideration of the factors
EPA used in withdrawing its proposed regulations for vinyl chloride, the
NRDC majority's decision contravened the Supreme Court's holding in
Chevron and permitted EPA to go beyond its statutory authority in converting an otherwise "health-based" statute into a "technology-based"
145. Id at 736. (Wright, J., dissenting) (citing S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
20 (1970)).
146. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(B) (1982).
147. Id. § 7412(e)(2).
148. Id. § 7412(b)(1)(B).
149. Id § 7412(c)(2).
150. 50 Fed. Reg. 1184 (1985).
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one.1 ' The decision not only undermines congressional intent, but conflicts with the D.C. Circuit's own precedent as well as with the Supreme
Court's.
Given the clarity of Congress' intent to prohibit the factors EPA used
in withdrawing its 1977 amendment, NRDC is in a strong position to prevail on rehearing.1 2 To uphold EPA's action would allow it to substitute
its judgment of what constitutes proper public policy for that of Congress.
Only Congress has the authority to decide whether EPA may consider
cost-benefit and feasibility factors in promulgating standards under the
Clean Air Act. Congress, however, clearly removed such factors from
EPA's consideration under section 112. Thus, the agency's consideration
of these factors in deciding to withdraw its 1977 amendments is contrary
to Congress' intent. The thrust of section 112 is to force industries to
achieve zero emission standards for nonthreshold pollutants. EPA's costbenefit and feasibility approach in regulating airborne carcinogens reflects
the agency's intent to promulgate lax standards. This approach will result
in decreased regulation of the vinyl chloride industry at the expense of
public health.
JOHN

A.

COPPEDE

151. NRDC, 804 F.2d at 738 (Wright, J., dissenting).
152. On January 28, 1987, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia granted NRDC's Petition for Rehearing. NRDC v. EPA, 810 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(per curiam).
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